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Abstract Contemporary virtue ethics, an agent-centred ethical theory, has been
presented as a response to inadequacies in more traditional act-centred theories.
In this paper, I argue that such a response is insufοcient: contemporary virtue ethics
fails to avoid the inadequacies that it purports to avoid, and brings with it problems
of its own. This paper is divided into 5 sections, in the οrst of which I introduce con-
temporary virtue ethics as an agent-centred and pluralistic ethical theory. In section
2, I present inadequacies that virtue ethics claims to avoid: being too reductive,
too algorithmic, too abstract, self-effacing, and self-other asymmetric. In section
3, I consider and analyse virtue ethics’ account of right action and of motives in
order to argue in section 4 that, if these inadequacies are indeed problems affect-
ing traditional ethical theories, virtue ethics does not avoid these problems either—
particularly because of its basis in the concept of virtues and its heavy reliance on
phronesis. I show that another ethical theory, limited moral pluralism, has the same
advantages of not being overly reductive, algorithmic, or abstract, and being self-
other symmetric, and that virtue ethics does not avoid self-effacement as it claims
to. I also question here whether self-effacement and self-other asymmetry should
be considered problems when evaluating moral theories. Finally, I suggest in sec-
tion 5 that virtue ethics is open to further criticisms of indeterminacy and lack of
explanatory power.
1 Introduction
Contemporary virtue ethics has been presented as a response to inadequacies in more
traditional theories. Virtue ethics claims that an action A, performed in certain cir-
cumstances, is obligatory if and only if A is an action that a virtuous person, acting in
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character, would not fail to perform in the circumstances in question (Timmons 2013,
280). Likewise, a wrong action is one the virtuous person would not do, and an op-
tional action is one the virtuous personmight do. Virtue ethics thus deęnes right action
in terms of character, so it is agent-centred rather than act-centred. It is also a plural-
istic moral theory rather than a monistic one: it posits more than one factor of intrinsic
moral relevance that explains the rightness or wrongness of an action, where these
factors are irreducible to any underlying principle.
In this paper, I argue that virtue ethics fails to avoid the inadequacies of traditional
act-centred ethical theories, and brings with it problems of its own. To do so, I ęrst
present the main problems aĝicting traditional act-centred ethical theories, which
virtue ethicists claim their agent-centred approach avoids: being too reductive, al-
gorithmic, and abstract; self-eěacement; and self-other asymmetry (section 2). Having
considered in further detail virtue ethics’ account of right action and of motives (sec-
tion 3), I argue that virtue ethics is notmore promising than traditional theories. First,
it cannot claim advantages over all other theories (section 4). Limited moral plural-
ism is also not too reductive, algorithmic, or abstract, and can be self-other symmetric,
while virtue ethics is also subject to the same problem of self-eěacement. Moreover,
self-other asymmetry, and possibly self-eěacement, do not have to be problematic for
ethical theories. Second, virtue ethics is open to the additional criticisms of its inde-
terminacy and lack of explanatory power because of its basis in the concept of virtues
and its heavy reliance on phronesis (section 5).
2 Problems with traditional act-centred ethical theor-
ies: motivating virtue ethics
The ęrst reason why someone might turn away from contemporary non-virtue-based
ethical theories is dissatisfaction with the aĴempt to make moral judgments by apply-
ing abstract principles to particular concrete cases (289–90). Hursthouse (1999) refers
to this project as codięability, and says that many ethicists have since dismissed the
idea that ethics can be ‘as codięable as used to be commonly supposed’ because of the
‘gap between the abstract principles and the complex particularity of concrete moral
situations’ (39–41). First, as a pluralistic theory, virtue ethics avoids the criticism of
being too reductive to account for our complex moral lives, and thus seems to have an
advantage over certain forms of consequentialism (Timmons 2013, 290). It also seems
to have advantages over most deontological theories (excluding Rossian limited moral
pluralism), as it avoids being too algorithmic, instead giving an essential role to moral
judgment (moral wisdom, phronesis) (Hursthouse 1999; Timmons 2013). Finally, des-
pite appealing to abstract principles making reference to what an ideal virtuous agent
would do, it makes its principles more concrete by specifying particular virtues and
is therefore not as abstract as many ethical theories (again, with the exception of lim-
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ited moral pluralism) (Timmons 2013, 290–91). Virtue ethicists are also opposed to the
usual focus on deontic categories of actions, believing that these are the wrong terms
and objects of evaluation to be emphasising in moral theory. For instance, Stocker
(1976) argues that, by focusing on abstract principles such as duty, obligation, and
rightness, contemporary ethical theories limit their scope to ‘a dry and minimal part’
of ethics, and so fail as ethical theories by ignoring the inner realm of motives and
how these relate to values (455). Virtue ethics concentrates on that inner realm, using
people (their character traits and dispositions) as objects of assessment. In so doing, it
uses aretaic terms (virtue- or vice-based terms) as the terms of assessment, rather than
deontic ones. Virtue ethics is thus able to be less abstract and algorithmic than most
other pluralist theories.
Traditionalmoral theories can also be criticised for being externality-ridden, as they
do not examine our inner lives as virtue ethics does. Stocker claims that, since tradi-
tional theories are ‘externality-ridden’, they do not recognise ‘people-as-valuable’ (460).
For Stocker, ethical theories that do not incorporate our motives are undesirable, be-
cause a person who adopts their values and principles as her own will either lack im-
portant phenomena in her life such as genuine love and friendship, or will suěer from
‘moral schizophrenia’ (455). On the one hand, if a person adopts the values of a tradi-
tional contemporary ethical theory as her own values and is motivated by these values
(so that there is harmony between her values and motives), her motives will preclude
genuine relationships like love and friendship (455). This is because Stocker thinks
that in such relationships, the other person must be valued or loved for her own sake,
as an end in herself (456–61). If love is motivated by values such as rightness, duty,
or obligation, or even by love itself or happiness derived from love, then the beloved
is ultimately loved for the sake of values, which precludes genuine love (456–57, 461).
On the other hand, if a person adopts the values of a traditional ethical theory as her
own values and is notmotivated by them, then she suěers frommoral schizophrenia: a
lack of harmony in hermoral life that comes from not beingmoved bywhat she values,
and not actually valuing the values bywhich she ismoved (453–54). Therefore, accord-
ing to Stocker’s argument, traditionalmoral theories either preclude harmony between
values and motives or preclude genuine relationships, both of which are necessary for
a good life (455). Keller (2007) calls this problem self-eěacement: a self-eěacing the-
ory is one that seems to require that what makes actions right (the values) is not what
agents should bemotivated by (themotives) (221). Virtue ethics seems to avoid this di-
lemma, because it explains right action ‘in terms of the virtues, and hence of motives’,
so a virtue ethicist’s values should be in harmony with her motives (224).
Another principal problemof traditionalmoral theories for Slote (Slote 1997) is their
self-other asymmetry, which also stems from their mistaken focus on deontic evalu-
ations of actions rather than on our inner lives (175). Judgments we make about the
deontic or specięcally moral category of actions change depending on whether we are
referring to others or to ourselves (for instance, saying that it is obligatory to beneęt
42 Aporia VЂϿ. 19 NЂ. 1
others but not to beneęt ourselves, or that it is morally beĴer to beneęt others than
to beneęt ourselves). Slote, however, points out that this self-other asymmetry is in-
consistent with the partiality of our common sense morality as well as many deonto-
logical theories, because they judge that we have more obligations towards close ones
than towards strangers (1997, 181–82, 185–86). Furthermore, self-other asymmetry is
problematic for Slote as it devalues and degrades moral agents, treating the agent’s
‘pursuit of her own well-being as lacking the [...] positive moral value one assigns
to her pursuit of others’ happiness’ (185–87). Consequentialism avoids this problem
because it is impartial, but this impartiality makes it unfairly demanding and leads
to an agent’s interests being overwhelmed by those of others, similarly degrading or
devaluing the moral agent (188-90). Slote suggests that a virtue-based ethical theory
can remedy this problem, since it will not be based on fundamental deontic or spe-
cięcally moral concepts, but on aretaic concepts instead (181, 186–88). In particular,
he proposes a common-sense virtue ethics based on ordinary thinking about what is
admirable and counts as a virtue, which would, for example, allow for ęnding self-
beneęting traits to be admirable but not morally so (186-88).
These criticisms of traditional ethical theories motivate virtue ethics, which is pre-
sumed not to be open to them—and if these are indeed problems for the other theories
that virtue ethics can avoid, then it has signięcant points in its favour.
3 Virtue ethics as an alternative to traditional theor-
ies: right action and motivation
Virtue ethics characterises right and wrong action in terms of facts about a virtuous
agent: the right act is what the virtuous agent would do. In its account of right action,
then, virtue ethics appeals to the hypothetical choices of an ideal agent who possesses
the virtues (relatively ęxed character traits or dispositions, deemed aretaically good or
admirable) and does not possess the vices (Timmons 2013, 270–71, 279–80). Virtue eth-
ics thus relies fundamentally on aretaic concepts and deęnes rightness only in relation
to them, if deontic concepts are used at all (Oakley 1996; Timmons 2013). The basis
for saying that an act is morally good or right is the aretaic classięcation of a character
trait as a virtue, so facts about virtues and virtuous agents are more basic than facts
about right action (Timmons 2013, 278). For instance, if a virtuous agent would per-
form an act (in the circumstances), that means that it is aretaically good, which implies
that choosing that act would be a morally good decision and its performance would
be right. Deontic concepts are therefore fundamental neither to action assessment nor
to action guidance, since they are derived from aretaic evaluations (Slote 1997, 2000).
Another key feature of virtue-ethical theories is that they must give an account of
the virtuous agent to whom it appeals, by specifying the virtues and explaining how
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the virtues are determined—that is, by giving content to its theory of value (or the-
ory of the good) (Timmons 2013, 279–80). There are two general approaches for do-
ing so. One is an Aristotelian approach wherein virtues are grounded in an intrins-
ically good, fundamental concept such as eudaimonia, so that virtues are determined
by which traits further and constitute a concept like Ěourishing. The other is a non-
Aristotelian approach that takes virtues to be themselves intrinsically valuable, such as
Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics, which derives virtues from common-sense views
about which traits are admirable (Oakley 1996; Timmons 2013).
Virtue-ethical theories can also vary onwhat their account of right action says about
an agent’s inner life—her motives, traits, and dispositions. The virtue-ethical criterion
of right action can be articulated as follows: an act A is right iě it is the act that a vir-
tuous agent V, acting characteristically, would perform under the given circumstances
C. This criterion can be interpreted in multiple ways. Action-centric accounts claim that
a person who performs A (in C) performs the right action if A is what V would have
done, regardless of her ownmotives and dispositions at the time (Oakley 1996, 135–36).
Here, all the emphasis is placed on the act: a person performing A with disharmony
between her motives and values would still be doing the right act. Action-and motive-
centric accounts strengthen this criterion by claiming that a person who performs A (in
C) performs the right action iě A is what V would have done and she has the same vir-
tuous motives and dispositions as V would have in performing the action. Oakley ar-
gues that virtue ethics must be understood in this more demanding way: ‘acting out of
the appropriate motives and dispositions is necessary for right action’ (136). Acting out
of virtuous motives is not however suĜcient for the action-and motive-centric account,
because it ‘allows for the possibility that an action done out of goodmotives ... may fail
to reach the appropriate standard of excellence which one is normatively disposed to
uphold’ (138). Here, the nature of the act performed still maĴers for right action. Such
is not the case for motive-centric accounts, which claim that a person who performs A
(in C) performs the right action iě she has the same virtuous motives and dispositions
that V does in performingA. Acting out of the appropriate motives is here suĜcient for
right action; the act itself is not considered, only the motive behind it. Motive-centric
accounts are often used in agent-based theories, where moral judgments of acts come
only from evaluations of traits and motives (Slote 1997, 209). No maĴer how virtue
ethics qualięes its account of right action, the virtuous agent is presented as an ideal
to be emulated, intending that we ‘seek to be virtuous agents’ (Keller 2007, 224).
4 Virtue ethics versus more traditional theories: is it
really preferable?
One of the apparent advantages of virtue ethics discussed earlier was that it seemed to
avoid the problem of self-eěacement. Keller (2007) argues that virtue ethics is actually
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subject to this criticism as well. According to Keller, since the right act is that which a
virtuous agent would do under the given circumstances, in doing that act one would
be motivated by a thought like ‘a fully virtuous person would [do this] ... And I want
to do what the virtuous person would do’ (Keller 2007, 226). For example, say that in
aiming to be morally good, I perform an act that expresses the virtue of generosity (as
it is what the virtuous agent, being generous, would do). My motivation to perform
this act lies in the fact that it is what a virtuous agent would do, meaning I am not being
moved by my own generosity (which would look something like, ‘this person needs
help, and this act would help them’).
Such a criticism, however, applies only to virtue ethics as understood by the action-
centric account (228). On the action-and motive-centric account of right action, virtue
ethics is not self-eěacing, as what it values (what rightness is based on) does include
the person’s motives: in acting how the virtuous agent would act, and so performing
the act that expresses virtue, a person is motivated by the virtuous agent’s motives
(the virtues) (228). By an action-and motive-centric account, when someone is motivated
from the X reasons by which the virtuous person would be motivated, then she is ‘mo-
tivated as the [virtuous] person would be motivated’ without being required ‘to have
any explicit thoughts of the virtue itself, or of the fully virtuous person’ (228).1 A virtu-
ous person, possessing the virtue of generosity, need not think about what a virtuous
agentwould do in her circumstances; theywould simply act out of generosity, thinking
something like ‘this person needs help, and this act would help them’. As Oakley says,
possessing a virtue ‘requires internalising a certain normative standard of excellence
… a virtuous agent will have certain… normative dispositions, which need not always
be consciously formulated or applied, but which will govern and shape their motiv-
ations and actions’ (1996, 137). As such, the action-and motive-centric account of right
action can avoid self-eěacement. But this approach is also available to non-virtue eth-
ical theories. For instance, a consequentialist theory could adopt a similar account of
right action that includes motives: it could say that a person who performs a generous
action, and thereby produces the best consequences, acts rightly if they are motivated
by generosity, by their desire to help someone, which produces the best consequences
(Keller 2007, 230). Since such a strategy for avoiding disharmony between actions and
motives is available to any ethical theory, virtue ethics has no advantage over theories
in this respect.
Another response to the objection of self-eěacement that virtue ethicists could ap-
peal to would be to argue that self-eěacement is not a problem ethical theories need
1. What I am referring to as an action-centric account here corresponds with a de dicto reading of
virtue ethics, while what I am referring to as an action-and-motive-centric account corresponds with a
de re reading (Keller 2007, 228). Drawing on Bernard Williams for this distinction, Keller explains that
reading ‘what the virtuous person would do’ de re means that we understand the virtuous person’s
actions to include their motives, i.e., the virtuous dispositions that motivate their actions (whereas a de
dicto reading would allow for the same action to be right when it is not motivated by these virtuous
dispositions) (228).
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to avoid. One appealing feature of virtue ethics is the Aristotelian idea that ‘one who
is learning to be virtuous may ęnd it useful to have the explicit motive of emulating
the virtuous person’ (227). If someone’s values are not in complete harmony with her
motives, because she is a virtue ethicist motivated by the idea that ‘such an act is what a
virtuous agent would do’, we do not need to see this as a problem for the theory—such
people are working towards true virtue and moral harmony, and indeed the theory
will not be self-eěacing for virtuous people (227). The action-centric account of right
action thus seems preferable: it allows an action which the virtuous agent would do,
but performed out of motives the virtuous agent would not have, to be right—as it is
the same action the virtuous agent would do. Nevertheless, virtue-ethical theories em-
ploying this account can still articulate through aretaic evaluation a diěerence between
the inner states of the non-virtuous agent and the hypothetical virtuous one, as any ac-
count of right action is only derivative from themain focus of the virtue-ethical theory,
the aretaic assessment of character. This approach also allows a vicious person to do
the right action out of deplorable motives, rather than not distinguishing between the
badness of the motives and the goodness of the action (it can recognise that such a case
is diěerent, as to outcomes but not as to virtues or vices involved, fromwhen a vicious
person does the wrong action out of deplorable motives).
One consequence of this kind of response, however, is that if self-eěacement is not
a problem for virtue ethics, then it is not a problem for other ethical theories either.
Proponents of these theories can also say that being moved by thoughts such as ‘this
act will produce the best consequences’ or ‘this act will respect others as ends in them-
selves’ is an acceptable way for people to think about their motivations, while learning
how to fully and harmoniously embody what they value. This all shows that virtue
ethics does not have the advantage of not being self-eěacing while other theories are,
and if in fact self-eěacement is not a problem for virtue ethics, then it need not be a
problem for other theories.
Onemain objection to virtue ethics is that it is indeterminate; that is, because it does
not provide an algorithm for moral decision-making (which above was given as an ad-
vantage), it cannot ‘yield real guidance’ (Timmons 2013, 292) . But, as we have seen,
virtue ethics can provide both action assessment and guidance: A is the right act be-
cause it is what a virtuous agent would do, and deciding to do A is the ‘morally correct
decision’ because it is what a virtuous agent would decide to do (Hursthouse 1999, 51).
Hursthouse argues that each virtue generates a prescription and each vice a prohibi-
tion (for example, honesty generates the rule ‘be honest’ and dishonesty generates the
rule ‘do not be dishonest’); she calls these rules, derived from our account of virtues,
‘v-rules’ (29, 37–39). Moreover, whichever way a virtue-ethical theory explains the vir-
tues, it must give an important role to moral wisdom (phronesis) for ‘interpret[ing] the
rules and… determin[ing] which rule’ should be applied (41). We are expected to have
some moral wisdom for identifying which traits are virtues and thereby generating
our list of v-rules, and a signięcant amount of moral wisdomwill be needed for apply-
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ing them to particularly diĜcult situations (Hursthouse 1999). So virtue ethics does
provide some kind of guidance here, in that a person with enough moral wisdom will
be able to intuit what a virtuous person, who is morally wise, would do.
The claim that morality is not codięable enough for there to be any kind of mech-
anical, general procedure for applying the v-rules can be taken as an advantage of
the theory (as discussed above), because it recognises the ‘complexity of moral phe-
nomena’ and so is not too algorithmic, reductive, or abstract (Hursthouse 1999; Rawls
2009; Timmons 2013). If that is true, then virtue ethics is not alone in recognising the
complex texture of moral life in this way, as non-virtue-based theories such as limited
moral pluralismmaydo so aswell (Hursthouse 1999; Timmons 2013). Virtue ethics’ ac-
count of right action is also still open to the objection of indeterminacy, since it relies so
heavily on moral wisdom. A virtue ethicist could argue that this is simply a necessary
feature of an ethical theory and that ‘we cannot plausibly expect more determinacy
from the principles of a plausible moral theory’ (Timmons 2013, 292).
But while all ethical theories rely on some measure of intuitive moral evaluations
to some extent, the extensive reliance on phronesis and consequent indeterminacy that
we see in virtue ethics (and in limitedmoral pluralism) poses a serious methodological
problem (Hursthouse 1999, 33). This problem comes out in Rawls’ (2009) criticism of
intuitionism,where he claims that ourmoral intuitions are ‘inĚuenced by our own situ-
ation’ and ‘strongly colored by custom and current expectations’, and that intuitionist
theories provide no criteria, other than cultural mores, for morally evaluating these
(35–37). As is suggested by Aristotle’s concept of the vicious person’s ignorance of the
universal (of what is good and bad), vicious people can believe that there is nothing
bad about actions expressing vices (Nicomachean Ethics 1110b25-30, 1150b30-37). So al-
though ‘there is nothing necessarily irrational in the appeal to intuition’, it is necessary
that we try ‘to reduce direct appeal to our considered judgments’ so as to reduce the
threat of moral relativism (41). Otherwise, as Heathwood (2007, 798) observes, our eth-
ical theory ‘leaves bigots and zealots on their own to intuit their preferred answers’. So
virtue ethics’ indeterminacy is actually one of its disadvantages, albeit one that limited
moral pluralism has as well.2
Finally, the last claimed advantage of virtue ethics discussed earlier is that it can
be self-other symmetric, while more traditional theories cannot be. According to Slote
(1997), common-sense virtue ethics is self-other symmetric: non-moral virtues (traits
outside of ‘the sphere of morality’ given aretaic value by common thinking) are in-
cluded in common-sense virtue ethics in a symmetrical and balanced relation with
moral virtues. However, given that some of the traits we ęnd admirable are moral
and some are non-moral (such as intellectual virtues), why can our ethical theory not
say that some traits are morally relevant and some are not (Timmons 2013)? In dis-
tinguishing between moral and non-moral virtues, Slote (1997) refers to the former
2. This disadvantage could be accepted as unfortunately necessary due to the facts of moral reality,
though, if virtue ethics were otherwise superior to other ethical theories.
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as ‘other-beneęting’ and the laĴer as ‘self-beneęting’; other-beneęting virtues are eth-
ically relevant, whereas non-moral, self-beneęting virtues are aretaically relevant, but
need not be considered within the sphere of morality. For instance, though we may
aretaically admire a person who promotes her own self-interest, a person who sac-
rięces herself for someone else instead is more morally admirable. We do not need
a virtue-ethical theory to recognize such a distinction—a consequentialist can ęnd a
person’s commitment to a project aretaically admirable while recognising that she ac-
ted wrongly in pursuing it rather than sacrięcing her life. So, while non-moral, self-
beneęting virtues are undoubtedly an important part of our lives, and ethical theories
would do well to incorporate them into their accounts for more nuance, this is not a
reason to favour virtue ethics in particular over other ethical theories. Ethical theories
that ‘permit us to seek our own well-being (within moral limits) ... as a mere concession
to agents’ well-being’ may just be reĚecting how some important areas of our lives are
non-moral (187).
Moreover, Slote proposes a self-other symmetric theory because he believes that the
self-other asymmetry of traditional ethical theories downgrades the moral agent. This
criticism is a variation of the over-demandingness criticism used against consequen-
tialism, applied to all non-virtue-ethical theories. But not all non-virtue-ethical theor-
ies are that demanding; for example, the limited moral pluralism of W. D. Ross (2002)
includes a prima facie duty to improve our own condition in respect of virtue or of in-
telligence alongside that of beneęcence, and other deontological theories could have
the option to include such rules. Since limited moral pluralism can take self-beneęting
seriously (as there are no absolute constraints to always outweigh it), if I object that
it is still too demanding, it will seem like I just do not want to be concerned with be-
neęting others. Likewise, the agent’s self-concern seems to be valued too highly in
Slote’s (Slote 1997, 193–94) suggestion that common-sense virtue ethics consider other
people ‘as a class or category’, rather than one-on-one. Despite allowing for more bal-
ance between concern for ourselves and for others so as not to downgrade the agent,
thinking of others as a class rather than as individuals downgrades other agents, whose
individual interests also maĴer. While I am not claiming that ethical theories should
be impartial, this is another area where we should question our intuitions; perhaps we
should instead follow the conĚicting intuition that Slote (1997) mentions, in which our
common-sensemoral thought treats permission to self-beneęt as a concession to agents’
well-being. Self-other asymmetry is thus not necessarily a problem, and since other
ethical theories can also recognise non-moral virtues, virtue ethics cannot claim self-
other symmetry as an advantage.
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5 Additional disadvantages of virtue ethics as amoral
theory
Another serious weakness of virtue ethics is its lack of explanatory power: what is it
about virtues that make actions that express them right? Since a character trait’s are-
taic goodness (which makes it a virtue) ‘bestows upon the action Ěowing from it the
property of rightness,’ virtue ethics needs to explain ‘why this character trait is good’
(Timmons 2013, 295). By the Aristotelian approach for grounding virtues, ‘the good-
ness of certain character traits’ is explained ‘in terms of their contribution to human
eudaimonia or Ěourishing’ (Timmons 2013, 296). But if a trait’s goodness is explained
by its contribution to eudaimonia, and that goodness is what makes the act that Ěows
from it right, then why not ‘explain the rightness of an action ... directly in terms of
its contribution to human Ěourishing?’ (296). Moreover, virtue ethics is considered to
be a pluralist theory, with the virtues being ‘irreducibly plural intrinsic goods’, but if
traits are considered good because they promote eudaimonia, it seems that the virtues
are reducible to the single, more fundamental intrinsic good of eudaimonia (fromwhich
the virtues are then derived) (Oakley 1996, 140).
By this account, then, virtue ethics looks like a formofmonism. The account ofwhat
makes an action right would be that it promotes eudaimonia, with the virtues as inter-
mediary stages that are instrumental to that promotion, and it would no longer be clear
that the theory, which is supposed to be virtue-based, needs to include virtues at all in
its account of right action. If this is the case, then we do not need, as Timmons (Tim-
mons 2013, 296) says, ‘to ęrst explain the goodness of traits in terms of Ěourishing and
then explain the rightness of action in terms of the goodness of traits; we can explain
both the goodness of traits and the rightness of action directly in terms of Ěourishing’.
Therefore, even without delving into the problems of deęning a concept like eudaimo-
nia and avoiding circularity in doing so, the Aristotelian approach cannot provide an
acceptable—truly virtue-based—explanatory account of right action for virtue ethics
(Slote 1997, 207; Timmons 2013, 295–96). Doing so would ‘deprive virtue ethics of its
distinctive character’ (Timmons 2013, 209).
Alternatively, for virtue-ethical theories that take the non-Aristotelian approach,
the goodness of character traits is ‘an unexplained brute fact’: ‘certain character traits
just are intrinsically good and ... their goodness need not be further explained’ (296).
Either the virtues are simply ‘grasp[ed] through intuition’ as ‘self-evident truths’, orwe
can reasonably suppose that a trait is a virtuewhen this claim is ‘supported by the body
of our considered moral beliefs’; that is, by internal support (296). While claims about
which traits are virtues do have internal support, this explanation for why these traits
are good is unsatisfactory. As Timmons notes, there are ways of plausibly explaining
why a trait like benevolence is good: sincewe can come upwith explanations forwhy a
particular virtue is good (for example, benevolence moves one to help people in need,
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showing respect for themas persons, and reduces suěering), it is unconvincing to claim
that their goodness is a brute fact. Only relying on intuition is undesirable for the
reasons discussed above, and here it is called into question by ‘the sort of constructive
criteria that are said not to exist’ (Rawls 2009, 39). Virtue ethics therefore cannot give
an adequate explanation of why acts are right or wrong.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that contemporary virtue ethics, as a response to perceived problems
in more traditional ethical theories, does not in fact avoid such problems itself, and
brings with it additional issues. Proponents of virtue ethics claim that deontological
or consequentialist theories suěer from being too reductive, algorithmic, abstract, self-
eěacing, and self-other asymmetric, and that virtue ethics can avoid these problems
and should therefore be preferred over the more act-centered ethical theories. These
reasons, however, do not hold as satisfactory advantages for virtue ethics. If virtue
ethics avoids being too reductive, algorithmic, or abstract, then Rossian limited moral
pluralism does too, so these are not reasons to choose virtue ethics over other con-
temporary ethical theories. With respect to the other apparent advantages, either con-
sequentialists or deontologists can make use of the same tools as virtue ethicists to
avoid the problems of self-eěacement and self-other asymmetry, such as including a
person’s motives in their account of right action or recognising self-beneęĴing as are-
taically valuable, or these need not be considered problematic for any ethical theory.
Moreover, in trying to be less reductive, less algorithmic, and less abstract than
other ethical theories, virtue ethics relies too heavily on phronesis and intuition, caus-
ing it to be too indeterminate as an ethical theory. An additional problem to which
virtue ethics is subject, and several more traditional ethical theories are not, is a lack of
explanatory power: it is unable to explain what it is about virtues that makes actions
expressing them right, without reducing the virtue-ethical theory to monism (and a
monistic theory would not be virtue-based, but, e.g., eudamonia-based), or appealing to
intuition and brute fact.
What were presented as advantages for virtue ethics are therefore not advantages
for it after all, and so are not convincing reasons to prefer a virtue-ethical approach to
a deontological or consequentialist one. Virtue ethics furthermore has additional dis-
advantages in its indeterminacy and lack of explanatory power. As such, although vir-
tue ethics brings up valuable considerations about the inner lives of agents that could
be used to supplement and reęne consequentialist or deontological theories, a virtue-
ethical approach to moral theory is not more promising than traditional act-centered
moral theories.
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